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The Neolithic transition from hunting and gathering to sedentary agriculture, which 
made possible the rapid technological progress that ultimately led to the Industrial 
Revolution, is one of the most important events in thousands of years of humankind’s 
economic development. In this paper we present theory and evidence showing that 
geography and biogeography exerted decisive influence on the location and timing of 
transitions to agriculture, to complex social organization and, eventually, to modern 
industrial production. Evidence from a large cross-section of countries indicates that 
the effects of geographic and initial biogeographic conditions on present-day levels of 
economic development are remarkably strong, even when conditioned on institutional 
arrangements that exert powerful proximate influence on the productivity of nations. 
The prosperity of nations varies enormously. Per capita incomes in countries within the top 
decile of the present day international distribution run about thirty times higher than 
incomes falling within the bottom decile. At the extremities differences in national 
economic prosperity exceed a factor of one hundred
1. What explains such large dispersion 
of the wealth and poverty of nations? 
Traditional economic theory points to accumulation of human and physical capital 
and to successful adoption of state-of-the-art technologies as the main sources of variation 
in economic productivity
2. In recent years, however, economists have begun to appreciate 
more fully the importance of more fundamental, institutional sources of growth and 
development. Capital accumulation and technology absorption are now commonly viewed 
as intermediate variables that are affected decisively by institutional arrangements 2 
supporting the smooth functioning of markets; especially honest and efficient government 
based on the rule of law and promoting impartial enforcement of contracts, security of 
property and related practices safeguarding private returns to entrepreneurship, innovation, 
investment and hard work
3. Empirical investigations applying standard statistical methods 
to cross-national data have established strong connections between such political-
institutional conditions and economic performance
4-8. 
In this article we demonstrate the importance of yet deeper sources of contemporary 
prosperity: biogeographic initial conditions in place some twelve thousand years ago. The 
model and empirical analyses reported ahead are broadly consistent with the sweeping 
framework for explaining world socio-economic and political history laid out by Jared 
Diamond
9. Diamond argues that the enormous size of the Eurasian continent, its large 
Mediterranean zone in the western part and the East-West orientation of its major axis, 
meant that Eurasia was more favourably endowed in pre-history than other regions with 
nutritious plants suited to cultivation, animals suited to domestication, and natural corridors 
of transit and communication facilitating circulation of goods, people, species and ideas. 
Because of these geographic and biogeographic advantages, Neolithic transitions from 
hunting and gathering to horticulture and animal husbandry occurred earlier in Eurasia than 
anywhere else. The superior agricultural mode of production made possible the 
establishment of a non-producing class of specialists whose members were crucial for the 
dynamic advance of technological knowledge, which is the principal engine of secular 
economic growth.  
Ahead we to formalize this line of thinking with a stylised dynamic model of long-
run economic growth and development, and we apply standard statistical methods to test 
the model’s implications in data. The empirical analyses support the following conclusions: 
(i) Geography is a key determinant of the biogeographic quality of various environments in 
pre-history. (ii) The richer were biogeographic endowments in various parts of the world, 
the earlier were Neolithic transitions to agriculture and, consequently; the earlier the onset 
of dynamic secular technological advance. (iii) Although market supporting institutional 3 
arrangements are the most powerful proximate source of prosperity, present-day levels of 
per capita income still register effects of geography and initial condition biogeography. 
Income production 10,000 BC to 2,000 AD,  [ ] 0, tT ∈  
We consider a time span of twelve millennia  [ ] 0,T t ∈ , beginning during the late 
Pleistocene at about 10,000 BC and running to the present-day, ca. 2,000 AD. By 10,000 
BC all the major continents had been populated by nomadic hunter-gatherers and climatic 
conditions had stabilized and ameliorated, which enhanced the prospects for productive 
agriculture
9,10. The time-line modelled and associated modes of production look as follows: 
Table 1 Model time-line (not shown to scale) 
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Let Yn denote net real production, Ln the population of workers and x(i) the quantity 
of intermediate capital goods employed in the n-th economy. Income production over all 








nn Yt x id i Lt
αα α
− = ∫ 0 , 1 ∈  (1). 
For simplicity and without loss of generality we take x(i)=1 at all i, n and t and take the 
population of productive workers to be “population”. We therefore write the production 
function for income per person as 4 
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Note that   is conceived as the stock of intermediate capital goods, inclusive of the 
technological knowledge associated therewith and embedded therein. It is the driving force 
of economic growth in most formal models of development. 
n A
Hunter-gatherer production and Neolithic transitions tt 0,
A   ∈  
The productive activity of hunting and gathering bands may be viewed for the most part as 
isolated, subject to little or no outside influence. The growth of intermediate capital goods 
deployed in production (coterminous with the growth of knowledge and technology) 
depended entirely upon biogeographic endowments. Let Ãn denote the productive potential 
of biogeographic initial conditions of the n-th environment during the late Pleistocene. 
Ahead Ãn is calibrated empirically by the numbers of large domesticable animals and 
heavy-seeded annual grasses that archaeological research indicates existed in various 
regions of the world 12,000 years ago, bearing in mind that only a very small fraction of all 
plants and animals in pre-history were edible or suited to domestiction
9,11-13. Hence in the 
hunter-gatherer era,   should be thought of as the number of such plants and animals with 
potential for domestication, though not yet domesticated, that have been incorporated into 
the subsistence economies of hunter-gatherers.  
n A
The equation of motion for  ( ) n At  during this era is 
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The parameter γ represents people’s propensity to learn from nature. It is constant over n. 
There were no inherent differences between societies in ability to learn about and exploit 
environments. Productive success derived solely from variation in biogeographic initial 5 
conditions  ; a rich environment supplied hunter-gatherers with more useful things to 
learn and more species to exploit. 
n A 
The foregoing differential equation has solution 
() ()
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t tt e ee
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Perhaps the most important events in humankind’s economic histories were the 
Neolithic transitions from hunting and gathering to sedentary agriculture – “agricultural 
revolutions” with production dominated by horticulture and animal husbandry. These 
transitions occurred at times   when 
A
n t ( ) n At  reached a threshold level A
A that was 
necessary to achieve agriculture. Solving equation (4) for transition dates  , that is for the 
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Archaeological research supplies data on the locations, biogeographic endowments 
and approximate dates of just six independent origins of settled agriculture spanning 
t=1500 to t=7500 (8,500 BC to 2,500 BC). Notwithstanding the micronumerousity, the 
implication of equations (3)-(5) for the technological progress of hunter-gatherers can be 
tested. Non-linear least squares estimates of (5) are reported in Table 2.  6 
 
Table 2 Estimates for the transition dates ( )
A
n t  equation  
Threshold level 
  m A A
Learning rate   




9.23 0.000306  .98  94.3 
(2.14|0.013) (0.0001|0.040)     
N=6. The estimator is non-linear least squares. In parentheses are 
(standard error|p-value). Biogeographic endowment   is an additive index 
scored (0,100] from archaeological data on the regional distribution of 
domesticable plants and animals in pre-history. (See Methods section.) 
n A 
 
In the empirical analyses ahead we use these estimated coefficients along with data 
on  to impute values of t  for a broad cross-section of present-day nations. (See the 
Methods section.) 
n A  A
n
Figure 1 shows the predictions of this regression experiment for number of years 
from period t=0 (from 10,000 BC) that it took hunter-gatherer communities to make the 
transition to agriculture in the six documented cases.  7 
 
Figure 1 Observed and fitted transition dates 
 
On the biogeography scale of  , the agriculture threshold is estimate to be 
. (Table 2) Equation (4) implies that log 
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This common calculation shows how it could take hunters and gatherers thousands of years 
to exploit fully the potential of their environment's biogeographic endowment, or to reach 
 at an earlier period and make the transition to agriculture. 
A A
Figure 2 graphs the estimated trajectories of ( ) n At  from initial period t  that are 
associated with four representative biogeographic endowments. The model predicts that the 
Neolithic transition occurs when 
0
( ) n At  crosses the estimated threshold  , which is 
shown by the horizontal line in the figure intersecting the 
m 9.23
A A =
( ) n At  axis at this value. The 
model implies that societies enjoying the two best-endowed environments depicted 
(corresponding to   scores of 100 and 50) make the transition to agriculture 
comparatively early, as was the case in most of Eurasia
9,14,15. Technological progress also 
occurs in societies with the least well-endowed biogeography shown in Fig. 2 (with an   
score of 6.5) as hunters and gatherers gradually exploited their environment’s rather dismal 
productive potential. But progress is slow and conditions are so poor that settled agriculture 
most likely never would have been initiated in isolation. Communities facing these 
circumstances – which would include inhabitants of areas now known as New Zealand, 
Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Samoa and much of present-day Australia and some of North 
America – essentially remained hunter-gatherers until they were absorbed, colonized or 
exterminated by states that arose in richer environments where agricultural revolutions 
occurred thousands of years earlier. The same fate was experienced by societies with 
mediocre biogeography (illustrated by 
n A 
n A 
13 n A =  ), which Fig. 2 indicates made the Neolithic 
transition relatively late, more than 6,000 years into our model history. Examples are much 
of sub-Saharan Africa and South America. Hunter-gathering communities still in existence 
are anthropological wonders of negligible number without correspondence to any present-
day national economy. 9 
 
Figure 2 Time paths of   under various biogeographic initial conditions  () n At
 
Economic growth after agricultural revolutions,    ( , ]
A tt T ∈
After Neolithic transitions technological change and economic growth were no longer 
constrained by the static limits of local biogeographic conditions  . The superior 
agricultural mode of production made possible specialization of productive activity and the 
establishment of a non-producing class devoted to the creation and codification of 
knowledge. What we think of as “civilization” slowly emerged: For example, the invention 
of writing, science, engineering, formal law, mechanisms of large-scale social organization 
and control, technology-based military prowess and the appearance of the first states. 
Communities now learned about and created capital goods well beyond the limits imposed 
by initial environmental conditions.  
n A 10 
The technological possibilities of agricultural economies,  , were now dynamic and 
entered a long era of exponential growth until the time of the industrial revolution, t , at 
which time technology reached the industrial threshold,   and technological possibilities 
made another discontinuous jump. This stylised characterization of long-run economic 
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The rate at which technological knowledge was incorporated to actual production during 
both the agricultural and industrial eras is  
() () () ()









δ >  (8). 
The differential equations for the productive technology of agricultural and industrial 
economies have solutions 
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The impact of technology growth on living standards over time depends on the 
associated growth rate of population. Historical scholarship indicates that during most of 11 
human history population growth fully absorbed income growth in Malthusian fashion 
leaving long-run per capita incomes constant at the subsistence level,  y , though there were 
short-run trends and fluctuations about the long-run subsistence equilibrium. The 
Malthusian link was broken comparatively recently at approximately the time of industrial 
revolutions commencing in Europe around 1,750 AD, that is around t 11750 =  and 
thereafter
16-20.  













t  (12) 
which left per capita output growth at zero and per capita incomes at subsistence: 
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yielding positive growth of per capita incomes and rising living standards: 
() () () () () 11 1 , (
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At current period T  equation (16) implies that log per capita incomes are 12 
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Solving equation (10) for  we obtain  
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where W  is Lambert’s W-function with  ( ) W  here taking a real value falling in the 
interval   because  ( 1, 0 − ) () /
,0
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. Furthermore, for any 
plausible value of  0 δ > , the exponential term  ( ) (
A
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 in (19) asymptotes to 
zero at present-day time T , even for economies entering the industrial age late in the 
process. The equation for log output per capita therefore implies a linear function amenable 
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are estimates of the agricultural revolution threshold and the learning rate, respectively, 
reported in Table 2. The model of course implies that the richer biogeographic initial 
conditions the higher present-day incomes per capita: 
m ˆ 9.23, 0.000306
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Biogeography, institutions and present-day prosperity 
Results of least-squares regression experiments for N=112 modern economies that are 
germane to the theoretical analysis above are reported in Table 3. 14 
 
Table 3 Regressions 
Dependent 
variables⇒ 
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Institutions       0.037 
(11.0|.00) 
Adjusted 
2 R   .79 .79 .52 .52 .58 .79 
 
N=112. The estimator is ordinary-linear least squares. Geography is an additive index scored 













   −= −   
     


expressed in thousands and 
based on the estimates  m ˆ,
A A γ  reported in Table 2 and calibrations of   discussed in the Methods 




n Tt −  always exceed the 
empirical maximum and therefore the estimated functions are (slightly) concave over their whole 
range and never backward bending.  is 1997 real GDP per capita expressed in US dollars and 
deflated by 1985 purchasing power parity (PPP) prices. Institutions is an additive index ∈ ; 
see Methods. In parentheses are (standard error|p-value) of coefficient estimates. Regression 




Regression model (1) demonstrates that exogenous geography accounts for 
approximately eighty percent of the international variation in late Pleistocene 
biogeographic endowments  . Consequently, as shown in model (2), geography is an 




n Tt −  implied by 
biogeographic initial conditions in various parts of the world. Although the geography 
index is measured by current conditions (see the Methods section), the stabilization of 15 
climatic conditions after the Younger Dryas means that it gives a good first approximation 
to relative geographic conditions ca. 10,000 BC and afterward (with significant exceptions 
such as the desertification of the Sahara and parts of the Middle East during the Holocene). 
Although we do not pursue the topic here, geography is more important to the domesticable 
plants component of the biogeography variable than to the regional distribution of large 
domesticable mammals. Under the “blitzkrieg” hypothesis
21 the world distribution of large 
animals was significantly affected by the timing of the arrival of Homo sapiens in various 
parts of the world: The later Homo sapiens reached various regions the greater was their 
skill as “big game hunters” and the less experience their prey had with human predators, 
which resulted in rapid overkill and extinction of large animals in North America and 
Australia during the late Pleistocene. 
Regression model (3) corresponds directly to the equation (20) and it therefore tests 
the strict implication of our stylised model of economic development over twelve millennia 
for the effect of biogeographic initial conditions on contemporary prosperity. Along with 
models (4) and (5) these results show that geography and biogeography alone can explain 
between fifty and sixty percent of present-day international variation in log output per 
capita. Note that ‘biogeography’ here means biogeographic initial endowments   as 




n Tt −  as defined in 
Table 3. In view of the imprecise measurement of biogeographic conditions in particular, 
these results are remarkable evidence of the importance of geography and biogeography to 
economic prosperity. The statistical relationship implied by regression model (5) is graphed 
in Figure 3. 16 
 
Figure 3  Impact of geography and biogeography on present-day per capita 
incomes. ‘Geography and biogeography’ is the sum log Geography, (  and 
 weighted by the corresponding estimated coefficients of model (5) Table 









Taken at face value the estimates of model (5) imply that a change from the worst 
geographic and biogeographic conditions to the best would yield a shift in 1997 GDP per 
capita from around 600 dollars to around 8,800 dollars. However, incomes per head 
observed in the regression sample of N=112 countries are far more dispersed, ranging from 
369 (Ethiopia) to 21974 (Luxembourg). A more complete accounting of international 
variation in economic prosperity requires additional explanatory factors. As pointed out in 
the introduction, the leading candidate is a measure of institutional arrangements affecting 
the productivity of economic activity.  17 
Regression model (6) adds to the previous specification a standard measure of 
institutional conditions affecting security of property, rule of law and enforcement of 
contracts (“Institutions”) that is identical or very similar to that used in many other studies
4-
8,22. (See Methods.)  This model fits nearly eighty percent of the variation in log per capita 
incomes and comes much closer to tracking the full range observed cross-nationally. The 
estimates imply that a change from the worst combination of geography, biogeography and 
institutional arrangements to the best would yield a change in per capita incomes from 350 
to 17,350 dollars. Although these results support the common conclusion that institutional 
arrangements supportive of a market economy have potent influence on the wealth and 
poverty of nations, institutions and prosperity are almost surely jointly endogenous, if only 
because rich countries have the resources to build institutions of high quality. 
Consequently, the estimated effect of institutions on current log per capita incomes likely 
represents to some degree the consequences of reverse causation. 
The same cannot be said, however, of our measurements of geography and 
biogeography, which are indisputably exogenous with respect to current incomes. Problems 
of joint endogeneity and reverse causation are therefore decisively ruled out with respect to 
these variables. Contrary to the conclusions of some studies
6-8, our results demonstrate that 
geography and biogeography retain statistical significance and substantive importance even 
when conditioned on institutional quality. This is true when geography and linear and 
quadratic terms in   are included in a regression model jointly with Institutions, as 
in model (6) Table 3, or are included separately with institutions, as in regression 
experiments not reported that are available by request. The evidence therefore strongly 
favours the claim that geography and biogeography directly affect economic performance
22-
25 rather than being wholly mediated by whatever influence they may have had in shaping 
historical development of institutions. Figure 4 shows the partial effects implied by 
regression model (6) of geography and initial condition biogeography by comparison to the 
partial effect of institutions. 
(
A
n Tt − )18 
 
Figure 4  Partial regression plots of the response of log GDP per capita 1997 to 
geography and biogeography and institutions. ‘Geography and biogeography’ is 
the sum of log geography, (  and  )
A
n Tt − ( )
2 A
n Tt −  weighted by the corresponding 
estimated coefficients of model (6) Table 3. 
It should be emphasized again, however, that institutional quality is an endogenous 
variable that most likely was affected historically by biogeographic endowments and 
geographic conditions
9. In historical time our evidence therefore implies that geography 
and biogeography are the primes mobiles of current prosperity. Consequently, regression 
model (5) Table 3 and Figure 3 more accurately register the deeper effects of geographic 
conditions and biogeographic endowments on the wealth and poverty of nations than 
models that also include institutions, because the endogeneity of the latter attenuates 
estimated effects of the former.  19 
 
Methods 
Where not adequately specified in the main text, measurement of variables in the analysis 
was as follows. All series are available from the corresponding author. 
Geography 
Geography is one hundred times the average of three constituent variables after each 
was normalized   by division of its maximum value in the N=112 country sample. 
Geography therefore varies ( . The constituents are: (1) Climate as measured by a 
four point scale based of the Köppen classification and ordered in ascending value 
according to how favorable conditions are to agriculture: 1=dry tropical or tundra and ice, 
Köppen classification B and E. 2=wet tropical, Köppen classification A. 3=temperate 
humid subtropical and temperate continental, Köppen classification Cfa, Cwa and D. 4=dry 
hot summers and wet winters, Köppen classification Csa, Csb, Cfb and Cfc, which is 
particularly favorable to annual heavy grasses. The data were obtained from Strahler and 
Strahler
26. (2) Latitude as measured by the absolute distance from equator in latitude 
degrees. The data are from the World Bank
27. (3) East-West orientation of axis as measured 
by the distance in longitudinal degrees between the eastern and westernmost points of each 
continent and dividing this number by the distance in latitudinal degrees between the 




Biogeography ( ) n A 
(0,1]
 is one hundred times the average of Plants and Animals after 
each was normalized   by division of its maximum value. Plants denotes the number of 
annual or perennial wild grasses known to exist in pre-history with a mean kernel weight 
exceeding 10 milligrams. The data are from Blumler
11. The geographical distribution 
ranges between 33 species in the Near East, Europe, and North Africa to 0 in the Pacific 
islands. Eurasia was divided into three subcontinents that had different and independent 
experiences of plant and animal domestication. The Western part reaches its limit in the 
Indus Valley in Pakistan, where the easternmost archeological evidence of crops from the 
Fertile Crescent have been found
13. Southeast Asia includes Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Papua-New Guinea. America was split up into three zones of independent agricultural 
origins; Central, North, and South. Caribbean islands and islands near Africa are regarded 
as belonging to the Central American and African zones respectively, while the Pacific 
islands (which are not in the sample analysed) are independent of the Asian zone of 
agricultural origin and hence had zero species suitable for domestication. 20 
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 used in the regressions shown 
in Table 3 is created for each country from the biogeography variable  discussed above 
and estimates of 
n A 
m ˆ γ,
A A  reported in Table 2. The European food and technology package 
was wholly transferred by Britain to the neo-Europes Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
the United States and these countries are therefore imputed with Britain’s value of () , 
9847. The same transference occurred by varying lesser degrees in many other former 
colonial nation states but we were unable to calibrate this. It is a source of imprecision in 
estimation of the influence of effective biogeography on current incomes. 
A
n Tt −
  Animals denotes the number of domesticable mammals weighing more than 45 
kilos, which are believed to have been present in pre-history in various regions. The total is 
14 and are the ancient ancestors of sheep, goat, cattle, horse, pig, Bakhtrian camel, Arabian 
camel, llama, yak, Bali cattle, reindeer, water buffalo, donkey, and the mithan
9. Of these 
14, western Eurasia and North Africa had access to 9, Eastern Eurasia 7, Southeast Asia 2, 
Central and North America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Australia and the Pacific islands 0
12. Early 
hunter-gatherers across the world typically had access to between 3-4 domesticable 
animals. 
Institutions 
The Institutions variable is based on ratings of the Private Risk Service Group’s 
International Country Risk Guide of five political-institutional characteristics of each 
country as assembled by Knack and Keefer
4. The constituents are (1) quality of 
bureaucracy, (2) rule of law, (3) government corruption, (4) risk of expropriation and (5) 
risk of government repudiation of contracts.  Scores on these variables were averaged over 
the period 1986-1995 and multiplied by one hundred after division by the maximum value, 
which yielded a (  index.  ) 0,100
1. http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/GNIPC.pdf 
2.   Barro, R.J. & Sala-I-Martin, X. Economic Growth New York, McGraw-Hill, 
(1995). 
3.  Hibbs, D.A. The politicization of growth theory. Kyklos 54, 265-286 (2001). 
4.  Knack, S. & Keefer, P. Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests 
using alternative institutional measures. Economics and Politics 7, 207-225 (1995).  
5.  Hall, R. & Jones, C. Why do some countries produce so much more output than 
others?  Quarterly J. Econ 114, 83-116 (1999) 21 
6.  Acemgolu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J. The colonial origins of comparative 
development: An Empirical Investigation. Am Econ Rev 91, 1369-1401.  
7.  Easterly, W. & R. Levine. Tropics, germs and crops: How endowments influence 
economic development. http://www.nber.org/papers/w9106, (August 2002). 
8.  Roderik, D., Subramanian, A. & Trebbi, F. Institutions rule: The primacy of 
institutions over geography and integration in economic development. 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9305, (October 2002). 
9. Diamond,  J.  Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies New York, 
Norton, (1997). 
10. Richerson, P. Boyd, P. & Bettinger, R.L. Was agriculture impossible during the 
Pleistocene but mandatory during the Holocene? A climate change hypothesis. Am. 
Antiquity 66, 387-411 (2001). 
11. Blumler, M. Seed Weight and Environment in Mediterranean-type Grasslands in 
California and Israel Ann Arbor, UMI Dissertation Services (1992).  
12. Nowak, R. (ed.) Walker´s Mammals of the World Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University Press (1991). 
13. Smith, B.D. The Emergence of Agriculture New York, Scientific American Library 
(1998). 
14.  Renfrew, C. World languages and human dispersals: a minimalist view. In 
Transition to Modernity. Essays on Power, Wealth and Belief. (eds. in J.A. Hale, 
J.A. & Jarvie, I.C.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, (1992), 11-68. 
15. Renfrew, C. Language families and the spread of farming. In The Origins and 
Spread of Agriculture and Pastoralism in Eurasia (ed. Harris, D.) London, UCL 
Press, (1996). 
16. Cohen, M.N. and Armelagos, G.J.. Paleopathology at the Origins of Agriculture 
New York, Academic Press, (1984) 
17. Fogel, R.J. Catching up with the economy. Am Econ Rev 89, 1-22. (1999). 
18. Johnson, D.G. Population, food and knowledge. Am Econ Rev 90, 1-14 (2000). 
19. Maddison, A. Phases of Capitalist Development Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
(1982). 
20. Livi-Bacci, M. A Concise History of World Population London, Basil Blackwell, 
(1992). 22 
21. Martin, P.S. Prehistoric overkill. In Pleistocene Extinctions (eds. Martin, P.S. & 
Wright, H.E.) New Haven, Yale University Press (1984), 75-120. 
22. Sachs, J. Institutions don’t rule: Direct effects of geography on per capita income. 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9490 (February 2003). 
23. Sachs, J.D. & Malaney, P. The economic and social burden of malaria. Nature 
Insight 415, 681-686 (2002)  
24. Gallup, J.L., Sachs J.D. & Mellinger, A.D. Geography and economic development. 
International Regional Science Review 22, 179-232 (1999).  
25. Mellinger, A.D., Sachs, J.D. & Gallup, J.L. Climate, Coastal Proximity, and 
Development. In Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography (eds. Clark, G.L., 
Feldman, M.P. & Gertler, M.S.). Oxford, Oxford University Press, (2000), pages. 
26. Strahler, A.H. and Strahler A.N. Modern Physical Geography New York, John 
Wiley and Sons, (1992) 
27. http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdmg /grthweb/GDNdata.htm. 
Acknowledgements 
The authors thank Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius’ Stiftelse, Vetenskapsrådet, and Adlerbertska 
Forskningsfonden for financial support of the research, Jack Goldstone for comments on an earlier draft and 
Michael Mitchell of UCLA Academic Technology Services for help decoding the mysteries of STATA 
version 8 graphics programming. 
Competing interests statement 
The authors declare that they have no competing financial interests. 
Correspondence and requests for data and other materials should be addressed to D.A.H. (e-mail: 
dhibbs@economics.gu.se). 